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MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
FOWLER HARPERt
"He is bold, willing to innovate, does not himself shrink from broad re-
sponsibility and would not have the Court abdicate its powers."', This charac-
terization is more applicable to some of the justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States during the past decade than it is to others. It is applicable
to none more than to Mr. Justice Rutledge and as to him, no more so than
when he dealt with the complexities which from time to time plague the Court
under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution..
2
During the span of his judicial career, Mr. Justice Rutledge participated
in some eighteen or twenty cases involving the "lawyers' clause."'3  This is
not a large number of cases for a ten-year period. But the list includes such
captions as Williams v. North Carolina,4 Estin v. Estin,5 Angel v. Bullington,6
Halvey v. Halvey7 Morris v. Jones," and others which are destined to occupy
a page in the chronicle of the full faith and credit clause to perplex the minds
of men for many years to come.
There is little doubt that the name Rutledge, in our judicial annals, will
for the most part be identified with the long and increasingly difficult struggle
to obtain and maintain the civil liberties which Americans, for a hundred and
sixty-one years, have been told were their constitutional due. But with the
t M.A., 1925, State University of Iowa; S.J.D., 1926, University of Michigan.
Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Levitan, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 34 VA. L. REV. 526, 551 (1948).
2. Art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." The Congress has acted under this clause, in
part, as follows: "Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts
of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28 U. S. C. A.
§ 1738 (1950).
3. Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U. S. 38 (1949); Rice v. Rice, 336 U. S. 674
(1949) ; Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U. S. 555 (1948) ; Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541 (1948) ;
Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948) ; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948) ; Order of
United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U. S. 586 (1947); Industrial Comm'n v.
McCartin, 330 U. S. 622 (1947) ; New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610
(1947); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947) ; Morris v. Jones, 329 U. S. 545
(1947) ; Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220 (1946) ; Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Esenwein, 325 U. S. 279 (1945) ; Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945):
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942) ; State Farm Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324
U. S. 154 (1945) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 (1943) ; Fowler v.
Pilson, 123 F.2d 918 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
4. 317 U. S. 287 (1942) ; 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
5. 334 U. S. 541 (1948).
6. 330 U. S. 183 (1947).
7. 330 U. S. 610 (1947).
8. 329 U. S. 545 (1947).
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unfolding story of one of the most technical of all constitutional doctrines, it
will appear that here also Mr. Justice Rutledge had a firm grasp of the
problems and their social and political implications.
For Mr. Justice Rutledge, federalism, as we know it, represented both
his constitutional and political faithY It was largely the boldness and the
skill of Marshall in using the commerce clause to fashion a nation that evoked
the strong emotion-near hero-worship, which Mr. justice Rutledge had for
the great Chief Justice. He was not, however, unaware of the function of
the full faith and credit clause as a nationally unifying principle, and the role
of the Court, in manipulating it, would have been a much more effective one
had some of his brethren on occasion not shrunk from the broad responsi-
bility which he was willing to assume.
When his brother Douglas pronounced what was supposed to be a death
sentence"0 on Haddock v. Haddock," Justice Rutledge, like many others of
us, supposed the end of that bastardized and bastardizing anomaly had come.
None protested more vigorously when Haddock's ghost began to stalk the long
miles from North Carolina to Nevada and return. 2 And it was at this point
that Justice Rutledge would have the Supreme Court act as such, and finish
the task it had so courageously begun of straightening out one of its most
tangled skeins.
It is true, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has remarked, that the Supreme
Court should not be turned into a divorce and probate court for the United
States.13 It is also true, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has also announced, that
neither the crudest nor the subtlest juggling of legal concepts could enable the
Court to bring forth a uniform national law of marriage and divorce.' 4 And,
to quote Mr. Justice Frankfurter for the third time, tangled marital situations
inevitably arise.'5 They arose before Haddock v. Haddock, and will continue
to arise, regardless of the Court's decisions in the Williams cases. But all
9. RUTLEDGE, DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH (1947).
10. "Haddock v. Haddock is overruled." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S.
287, 304 (1942), holding that an ex parte divorce in Nevada was entitled to full faith
and credit in North Carolina, the matrimonial domicile of the parties, if the plaintiff
in Nevada had acquired a domicile there.
11. 201 U. S. 562 (1906), holding that New York, the domicile of the wife at all
times and the matrimonial domicile of the spouses, need not recognize a Connecticut
degree of divorce obtained e.x parte by the husband after he had become domiciled there,
although concededly the divorce was "valid" in Connecticut.
12. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945), holding that North Carolina,
the matrimonial domicile, in a bigamy prosecution might examine the "jurisdictional fact"
of domicile in Nevada after a divorce and remarriage there and return to North Carolina.
A conviction was upheld in the Supreme Court on the finding by the state court that there
had been no change of domicile from North Carolina to Nevada when the divorce was
granted there.
13. Concurring in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 305 (1942).
14. Id. at 304.
15. Ibid.
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this is not to say that the full faith and credit clause and the Act of Congress
passed under it have not given the Court a tool with which the evil after-effects
of family disorganization may not be substantially minimized. This, over the
continuing protest of some of the justices, the Court has succeeded in doing
in a half-way manner. Always, however, the second Williams case stands as
an obstacle to faltering progress.
The first Williams case made new law. But the "law" that it made was
incomplete. It was not enough. It was no sure foundation upon which to
replace the crumbling ruins of the patchwork structure which had arisen from
Haddock. It required a still bolder stroke, one which Mr. Justice Rutledge
was prepared to make in Williams II, but with only three of his brethren
supporting him.
In Williams I the law emerged, for a brief moment, from its "domiciliary
wilderness""6 when the Court answered the question as to "whose domicile"
was necessary for divorce by saying "either party's." The sixty-four dollar
question was yet to come, namely, what kind of domicile. In refusing to "retry
the facts," the Court, in effect, refused to answer the question at all, leaving
the matter for the states to handle. This, as a settled policy, might have a
good bit to be said for it. But once the Court embarks on the full faith and
credit enterprise in family matters, it may be a valid criticism that it aborts
the process by not finishing the job, thus leaving "to the caprice of juries the
faith and credit due the laws and judgments of sister states,117 and recreating
the constitutional void between due process of law in the decreeing state and
full faith and credit in others.
For persons concerned about the dilemma reborn with Williams II, two
troublesome ideas prevail throughout the majority opinion, both dealt with in
Mr. Justice Rutledge's devastating dissent. First is the overconcern lest "the
policy of each state in matters of most intimate concern . . . -be subverted by
the policy of every other State."'" The emphasis laid on this anxiety appears
to rest largely on the many value assumptions which characterize most of the
"law" of marriage and divorce and which rarely are examined critically. Here
are assumed community attitudes toward marriage, assumed states interests,
assumed public policies, assumed familial values, and assumed nores which, it
is safe to say, frequently do not exist at all, or at most, receive only frag-
mentary approval in the communities involved.
For who believes that marriage is more sacred in North Carolina than in
New York or California, where thousands of Nevada, Florida, Arkansas, and
16. Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226,
244 (1945).
17. Id. at 245.
18. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226. 231
(1945).
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even Parisian or Mexican divorcees remarry each year, presumably to live
thereafter in a secondary or tertiary state of matrimonial bliss? Who thinks
that the family stood higher in the South Carolina scale of societal values for
the first hundred and fifty-nine years of her statehood than for the last two ?'9
It is hard, indeed, to believe that it was alone the facts of a Nevada divorce
and remarriage which sent two American citizens to the rock pile notwith-
standing the Constitution of the United States. Behind it, one may surmise,
must have been the vindictiveness of discarded mates, or in any event, of a
community whose moral pretentions had been offended by the brazen naivet6
of the hapless Williams. Thus, it was less an offense against North Caro-
linian morals than North Carolina's mores which sent this man and woman to
jail-not so much what they did but the effrontery with which they did it. One
can no more parade his matrimonial deviations in North Carolina, than he
can in New York where, if he is not to give up his home, he must become a
criminal in order to get a divorce. Prosecutions for adultery in New York,
however, are not up to the divorce rate, and jail for "progressive polygamy"
is there almost unknown today. It is safe to assume that discreet adultery or
matrimonial perjury is tolerated in North Carolina to much the same point as
in New York. It is at least questionable whether the Williams bigamy case
touched "matters of most intimate concern" to North Carolina. It is still
more questionable whether the maintenance of community cant justifies dilu-
tion of the faith and credit which the Constitution presumably requires to
the judicial proceedings of a sister state.
And this leads to the second point in connection with Mkr. Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Williams II. His overemphasis upon assumed state policy
is, quite necessarily, accompanied by an underemphasis on the constitutional
policies of national unity and certainty in "matters of most intimate concern"
to the nation. 2%r. Justice Rutledge did not fail to drive the point home.
It is exactly for the situation where state policies differ that the
clause and legislation were intended. . . . The very function of the
clause is to compel the states to give effect to the contrary policies of
other states when these have been validly embodied in judgment.
To this extent the Constitution has foreclosed the freedom of the
states to apply their own local policies. The foreclosure was not in-
tended only for slight differences or for unimportant matters ...
The Constitution was not dealing with puny matters of inconse-
quential limitations. If the impairment of the power of the states
is large, it is one the Constitution itself has made.2 0
For Mr. Justice Rutledge, legal certainty was no sacred cow. He recog-
nized change as the life of the law as well as the law of life. Nevertheless, he
also recognized that certainty and stability are important policies of the law
19. Divorce was barred in South Carolina by the state constitution until 1948.
20. Dissenting in Williams V. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 254 (1945).
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and, especially in the field of Conflict of Laws, make heavy demands on the
lawgiver for consideration. Moreover, where family law is involved, such
consideration should be more than ordinarily serious. Uniformity is a crucial
aspect here of certainty. Uniformity is not promoted nor for that matter is
bigamy discouraged by a situation where a man may legally have one wife in
Nevada and a different one in North Carolina. Said he:
No more unstable foundation, for state policies or marital relations,
could be formulated or applied. In no region of adjudication or
legislation is stability more essential for jurisdictional foundations.
Beyond abnegating our function, we make instability itself the con-
stitutional policy when the crux is so conceived and pivoted.2
Just four years after Williams I, the Supreme Court was "to record in
[its] report an example of the manner in which, in the law of domestic rela-
tions, 'confusion now hath made his masterpiece.'"22 The Rice case differs
from the garden variety of migratory divorces in the important factor that
the errant plaintiff never returned to the state of matrimonial domicile at all.
Herbert Rice had lived twenty years with his wife in Connecticut. He went
to Reno, got his divorce (or what Nevada called a divorce), married Hermoine
(who also thought the Nevada decree was a divorce), got a job in California,
and lived there until he died. When Mr. Justice Rutledge remarked in the
Williams case that ". . . all that is needed, to disregard it [a foreign divorce
decree], is some evidence from which a jury reasonably may conclude there
was no domiciliary intent when the decree was rendered,"23 he could hardly
have foreseen that within four years, the Court would make it still easier for
a state to deny faith and credit to a sister-state decree. The Supreme Court
of Errors for Connecticut denied validity to Herbert Rice's Nevada decree,
and therefore to his subsequent marriage to Hermoine, by simple resort to the
rule that the old domicile is retained until a new one is acquired, coupled with
the presumption of continuance of the old domicile until the burden of estab-
lishing the new one is met.2 4 The Supreme Court of the United States ap-
proved this technique. "In this subtle way," Professor Rheinstein has pointed
out, "the presumption flowing from the Nevada decree is made innocuous
and the way is open to a finding that Herbert had never become a domiciliary
of Nevada. ' 21 No longer is some evidence required to uphold a finding of
lack of domiciliary intent. None at all is required.
It thus appears, as Mr. Justice Rutledge feared, that any kind of a record
will do for a denial of validity to the sister-state decree. The Court will not
21. Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting, id. at 246.
22. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Rice v. Rice, 336 U. S. 674, 676 (1949).
23. Dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 248 (1945).
24. Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn. 440, 58 A.2d 523 (1948).
25. Rheinstein, Domicile as Jurisdictional Basis of Divorce Decrees, 23 CONN. B. J.
280, 289 (1949).
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"retry the facts." It adheres to "unitary domicile" and to the "jurisdictional
fact" theory. It thus, in his judgment, abdicated its functions under the full
faith and credit clause. But Mr. Justice Rutledge refused to concur in the
abdication. He thought a "major operation . . .required to prevent it,"2" and
he was ready to take his part in the surgery.
It should not be supposed that Mr. Justice Rutledge was insensitive to
the legitimate concern of a state over the marital status of its residents. "One
could understand and apply, without decades of confusion," he said, "a ruling
that transient divorces, founded on fly-by-night 'residence,' are invalid where
rendered as well as elsewhere; in other words, that a decent respect for sister
states and their interests requires that each, to validly decree divorce, do so
only after the person seeking it has established connections which give evi-
dence substantially and objectively that he has become more than casually
affiliated with the community. '27 Again, "It is hard to see what legitimate sub-
stantial interest a state may have in providing divorces for persons only tran-
siently there or for newcomers before they have created, by reasonable length
of stay or other objective standards, more than fly-by-night connections. '2
The problem, thus, is to find appropriate criteria which will recognize the
legitimate concerns of states with conflicting policies, apply them, and then
require obedience to the command of the Constitution. Boldly, he put his
finger on the vulnerable point of the entire structure, domicile.
Domicil, as a substantive concept, steadily reflects neither a policy
of permanence nor one of transiency. It rather reflects both in-
constantly. The very name gives forth the idea of home with all its
ancient associations of permanence. But 'home' in the modern world
is often a trailer or a tourist camp. Automobiles, nation-wide busi-
ness and multiple family dwelling units have deprived the institution,
though not the idea, of its former general fixation to soil and locality.
But, beyond this, 'home' in the domiciliary sense can be changed
in the twinkling of an eye, the time it takes a man to make up his mind
to remain where he is when he is away from home. He need do no
more than decide, by a flash of thought, to stay 'either permanently
or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.' No other connec-
tion of permanence is required. All of his belongings, his business,
his family, his established interests and intimate relations may remain
where they have always been. Yet if he is but physically present
elsewhere, without even bag or baggage, and undergoes the mental
flash, in a moment he has created a new domicil though hardly a
new home.
Domicil thus combines the essentially contradictory elements of
permanence and instantaneous change. No legal conception, save
possibly 'jurisdiction,' of which it is an elusive substratum, affords
such possibilities for uncertain application. The only thing certain
about it, beyond its uncertainty, is that one must travel to change his
26. Dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 255 (1945).
27. Id. at 256.
28. Id. at 261.
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domicil. But he may travel without changing it, even remain for a
lifetime in his new place of abode without doing so. Apart from the
necessity for travel, hardly evidentiary of stabilized relationship in
a transient age, the criterion comes down to a purely subjective
mental state, related to remaining for a length of time never yet
defined with clarity.29
For Mr. Justice Rutledge, the escape from this inherently contradictory
and anomalous situation must be "forthright and direct." He was prepared to
fix objective, discoverable standards as a substitute for "domicile" as the
jurisdictional requirement for divorce. Domicile, he was convinced, must go.
"The conception has outlived its jurisdictional usefulness unless caprice,
confusion and contradiction are the desirable criteria and consequences of
jurisdictional conceptions." 3  The years and cases since have not proved
him wrong.
The proposal to abandon an old and cherished concept of the common
law failed to evoke enthusiasm either from Mr. justice Rutledge's brethren
or from the profession. For notwithstanding Mr. Justice Black's protest
that Williams I1 provided "a new constitutional concept of 'jurisdiction.'
which itself rests on a newly announced federal 'concept of domicile,' "31 the
domiciliary theory of divorce jurisdiction is almost as old as divorce litigation
in common-law countries. It was Mr. Justice Rutledge's proposal to substitute
for it something more usable that was new and startling-so startling, indeed,
that cautious critics immediately resorted to the argument which, from time
immemorial, has been used to block change: legislation is not the province
of the courts.32  Mr. Justice Rutledge knew better. He knew that the ques-
tion was not whether the Court should legislate, but what legislation it should
create. Had his views become law, another peg would have been added to
our federalism and a lot of dirty family linen laundered.
His "boldness," together with his intensely pragmatic approach to the
practical politics of the law no doubt induced Mr. Justice Rutledge to go along
with Mr. Justice Douglas' innovation of "divisible divorce" in Esenwein v.
Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein"3 and Estin v. Estin.3 4 To be sure, divorce
29. Id. at 257-8.
30. Id. at 256.
31. Dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 277 (1945).
32. See Lorenzen, Extraterritorial Divorce-Villiams v. North Carolina II, 54
YALE L. J. 799, 808 (1945).
33. 325 U. S. 279 (1945). This case was decided on the same day as Wi'illiams II.
The Court held that Pennsylvania could continue to enforce a support order against
a husband which had been entered prior to his ex parte Nevada divorce, because he had
not acquired a bonda fide domicile in the latter state. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred
on the ground that a valid decree against a nonresident wife domiciled in Pennsylvania
need not be given the effect in the latter state of terminating the husbanls duty of
support. "But I am not convinced" he said, "that in absence of an appearance on personal
service the decree need be given full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance or
support of the other spouse or the children." Id. at 282.
34. 334 U. S. 343 (1948). In this case, the husband was admittedly domiciled in
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was made completely divisible by neither case,35 but the jurisdictional distinc-
tion is made between decrees which alter marital status and those which de-
prive a woman of her right to support. Here there is no denying the legiti-
macy or the reality of the interest of the state of the nonresident divorced
wife's domicile. That interest is recognized and the state is permitted to
protect it, but not at the expense of bastardized children and bigamous spouses.
The rediscovery of the "divisible divorce" is a long step toward the solu-
tion of many problems which arise in our one nation of many sovereign states.
It was necessary to ignore the implications of a number of earlier cases38 and,
in a sense, to disinter the unobjectionable aspects of Haddock v. Haddock,1
7
thus giving considerable point to the quaere raised by Professor Cook at the
time of the first Williams case38 and that by Professor Bingham some years
before. 9
The Estin policy has been criticized on the ground that it imposes "upon
men the burden of two families when the courts of their domicile have deter-
mined they need not bear it."' 0 This may be so, but it is not easy to discern
the merits of a policy which permits men to throw off the burden of the family
they have merely by getting a new domicile and a new family. The suggestion
that the second domicile can constitutionally free them from the burden of
supporting the first family and that third states can take their choice of fami-
lies which he must support is hardly convincing.
But is the principle of the Estin case applicable only to ex parte decrees?
If the parties are before the court, does the doctrine of res judicata as it exists
Nevada when he obtained an ex parte divorce, subsequent to a valid support order in
New York. The New York court held that the support order survived the divorce. The
Supreme Court refused to interfere. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
again distinguished between the Nevada decree as determining status and as interfering
with the right to support of the absent spouse. His opinion appears to have two facets,
one, the legitimate nature of New York's interest in the support of its citizen and, two,
the lack of jurisdiction of Nevada to deprive the absent spouse of her right to support
under the New York decree. See Carey & MacChesney, Divorces by the Consent of the
Parties and Divisible Divorce Decrees, 43 ILL. L. REv. 608, 614 et seq. (1948).
35. Both the Esenwein and Estin cases involved the question of survival of a prior
support order after divorce. Complete divisibility, based on Mr. Justice Douglas' first
ground in Estin (see note 34 supra) would permit the state of the wife's domicile to
render a decree for alimony after the foreign divorce.
36. See, e.g., Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901) ; Thompson v. Thompson,
226 U. S. 551 (1913).
37. 201 U. S. 562 (1906). After an ex -parte decree obtained by the husband in
Connecticut where he was unquestionably domiciled, the wife whom he had previously
deserted in New York obtained a limited divorce and alimony there. The Supreme
Court affirmed. The distinction between the effect of the foreign decree in determining
status and in terminating the right to support could explain the decision. See Paulsen,
Mifqratory Divorce: Chapters III & IV, 24 IND. L. J. 25, 46 et seq. (1948).
38. Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?, 18 IND. L. J. 165 (1943).
39. Bingham, The American Law Institute vs. The Supreme Court, 21 CORNELL
L. Q. 393 (1936).
40. Carey & MacChesney, Divorces by the Consent of the Parties and Divisible
Divorce Decrees, 43 ILL. L. REv. 608, 616-617 (1948).
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in the divorcing state become mandatory in the first state? Mr. Justice
Rutledge's concurrences in Sherrer v. Sherrer41 and in Coe v. Coe4 2 are in line
with his abandonment of domicile as a jurisdictional necessity for divorce.
Thus where the defendant .appears, aside from the rare bigamy prosecution,
Mr. Justice Rutledge's position in Williams II has been all but formally
vindicated.
If the suggestion that "unitary domicile" be abandoned as an outworn
concept in the migratory divorce cases was a bold one, Mr. Justice Rutledge's
little noticed suggestion for the solution of the equally delicate problem of
child custody was equally so. For a century or so American courts have been
paying lip service to the principle that in custody cases the best interests of
the child must be the paramount consideration. No doubt, for the most part,
the repetition in judicial utterances of this formula has been made with the
best of intentions. It is hard to escape the impression, however, that notions
of a bygone age have crept in subtly to affect the courts' judgment of what is in
the best interests of the child.43 Certainly the not uncommon practice of
dividing custody of a child of tender years between two alienated and hostile
parents is not in the best interests of the child, however such an arrangement
might appeal to a court as a compromise between the devoted but neurotic
parents. Probably the "part-time" child is the most unfortunate of all children
so far as concerns its mental health and future happiness.44  This is almost
certain to be the case when relations between the parents have become so bad
that divorce is accompanied or followed by kidnapping of the childish pawn
and "an unseemly litigious competition between the states and their respective
courts as well as between parents.
45
Such an unhappy situation was reflected in Halvey v. Halvey46 when
41. 334 U. S. 343 (1948). After a Florida divorce where both Massachusetts hus-
band and wife were before the court, the issue of the plaintiff's domicile was res
judicata in Massachusetts, as it was in Florida, even though the question of domicile
had not been challenged in the Florida proceedings.
42. 334 U. S. 378 (1948). After a Nevada decree where both Massachusetts husband
and wife were before the court, the "wife" sought to enforce a prior Massachusetts
support order. The state court gave her relief on the ground that the Nevada court
did not have jurisdiction. This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court on the
authority of Sherrer v. Sherrer. Here again, the question of the Nevada court's jurisdic-
tion had not been raised in the proceedings there.
43. In People ex rel. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 91 App. Div. 322, 86 N. Y. Supp. 539
(1st Dep't 1904), a child of about three was awarded to the custody of the mother
because of his tender years since it was concluded that this was necessary in the best
interest of the child. Two years later, it was found that the child was no longer of
such a tender age that his "best interest" required the mother's care. He was awarded
to the father, by reason of his "paramount right" to the child's custody. People ex i-el.
Sinclair v. Sinclair, 47 Misc. 230, 95 N. Y. Supp. 861 (Sup. Ct. 1905).
44. See Davis, Sociological and Statistical Analysis, 10 LAW & CONTE-ALP. PROB.
700 (1942).
45. Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330
U. S. 610, 620 (1947).
46. 330 U. S. 610 (1947).
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Mr. Justice Rutledge made the imaginative and appealing suggestion that the
best interests of the child should be the controlling consideration, "not only
for disposing of such cases as a matter of local policy, as it is in Florida and
New York, but also for formulating federal policies of full faith and credit,
as well as of jurisdiction and due process in relation to such dispositions.
'47
Here Mr. Justice Rutledge carries to the constitutional level a theory and
approach which some have long advocated as proper for cases which arise in
the Conflict of Laws.48 It is a break from conceptualism in its classical sense,
and an attempt to evaluate competing policies in the light of their social utility.
Mfore, it is frank recognition that the regularity of the law may on occasion
make demands on the courts less compelling than the regularity of the lives of
human beings.49  Not only the desires of parents who cannot get along with
each other but the symmetry of constitutional theory must sometimes give way
for the promotion of social values more important to civilization than either.
Uniformity, certainty, and predictability are not lightly to be sacrificed, but
for Mr. Justice Rutledge, they were imperfect means to an end.. When their
inadequacy became apparent, he was not afraid to improvise more appropriate
devices.
II
No single doctrine of the Constitution has given birth to more subtle
complexities than the full faith and credit clause and the apparently innocent
Act of Congress implementing it. No justice in the Supreme Court's history
can be said to have mastered all the technicalities of these provisions and the
most capable justices have frequently been baffled by some of them. If one
were to venture a guess as to the verdict of history, it probably could be said
with considerable plausibility that Mr. Justice Rutledge occupied a place on
one of the most distinguished benches in the life of the Republic. Neverthe-
less, the full faith and credit principles have puzzled the minds of all who
grappled with them during his tenure. Divided courts, dissenting and con-
curring opinions were the rule rather than the exception in the technical deci-
sions as well as in those where the policy issues were large and obvious. On
any showing, Mr. Justice Rutledge made a record here for legal craftsmanship,
exceeded by few if any of his predecessors, if we are permitted to judge on the
basis of avoidance of fallacy and pitfall which often lead both lawyer and
47. Id. at 620.
48. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173 (1933);
Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 56 YALE L. J. 1156 (1947).
49. Cf. Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287,
324 (1942): ". . . I had supposed that our judicial responsibility is for the regularity
of th law, not for the regularity of pedigrees."
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judge into error. Moreover, he was ever wary lest technicality become sheer
technicality, obliterating the policy of the principle involved.
A good example is his handling of the treacherous problem in Angel v.
Bullington.5 ° Not only did he cut through the confusing intermixture of res
judicata and Erie R. R. doctrines of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, but he
pointed out what apparently escaped both Justices Frankfurter and Reed,
that the full faith and credit clause might solve the problem without resort
either to res judicata as a federal rule, or to Erie as requiring a state rule. The
Court had already held that the decision of a state court which under the state
rule was res judicata must constitutionally be given the same effect in a federal
court sitting in the same state." This being so, an examination of the decision
of the North Carolina Supreme Court in the Bullington series5 2 discloses, as
Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed out, that in its judgment the statute involved
did "not outlaw substantive claims but only deprives the state courts of power
to entertain them."--, So interpreted, the North Carolina statute is neither
"procedural" nor "substantive" in the sense of Eric v. Tompkins or, for that
matter, any other sense. It is a limitation on the power of state courts to hear
and decide. Given the same effect by the federal court, it would leave un-
touched the power of such court to hear and determine Bullington's substantive
right to a deficiency judgment against his debtor. When all is said and done
about Bullington, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion still leaves unanswered
the question why either res judicata or Eric demands repudiation of a ninety-
year-old rule," to say nothing of the application of full faith and credit.
'orris v. Jones" gives us the full faith and credit rule in its most intri-
cate form. Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote no opinion but he did not fall into the
trap which snared his brother Douglas and five other colleagues. This case
involved the validity of a ruling by an Illinois court rejecting a claim in liqui-
dation proceedings based upon a Missouri judgment. Chicago Lloyds, an
"unincorporated association," had been authorized by the State of Illinois to
conduct an insurance business in Illinois and in other states. An action for
damages for malicious prosecution and false arrest was initiated against it in
Missouri, where the concern was doing business. Before judgment in this ac-
tion, a liquidator was appointed by an Illinois court under Illinois statutes
50. 338 U. S. 183 (1947).
51. See American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932).
52. Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E.2d 411 (1941).
53. Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183, 201 n. 2
(1947).
54. In Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, 175 (U. S. 1858), Mr. Justice Campbell said
that "this court has repeatedly decided that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States over controversies between citizens of different States cannot be impaired by the
laws of the States, which prescribe modes of redress in their courts, or which regulate the
distribution of their judicial power."
55. 329 U. S. 545 (1947).
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regulating the insurance business. In appointing the liquidator, the court fixed
a time for filing of claims and issued an order staying all suits pending against
the firm. Notwithstanding actual notice of this order and the withdrawal of
the company's attorney pursuant to the direction of the Illinois court, _Mlorris
prosecuted his tort action in Missouri and obtained a default judgment. After
presentation of this judgment claim, denial by the statutory liquidator in
Illinois, and affirmance by the Supreme Court of Illinois, Morris got to the
Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the
Court, held that Illinois had failed to give that faith and credit to the Missouri-
judgment which Section 1 of Article 4 of the Constitution requires. Justices
Frankfurter, Rutledge and Black thought otherwise. The majority regarded
the question with oversimplicity: since the judgment obtained by Morris in
Missouri was "final" there, it had to be "final" in Illinois. The result is
ludicrous. If Morris had obtained his judgment after the appointment of a
"liquidator" in Missouri, it would not have had the character of "finality"
there. On the other hand, if Morris had obtained his judgment in Illinois, it
would have lacked "finality" in the Illinois liquidation. But by obtaining
it in Missouri and presenting it to an Illinois liquidator, it is "final" at its face
value. Thus the Constitution of the United States requires that the Missouri
judgment creditor receive better treatment in Illinois than he would receive
in his own state and better than Illinois judgment creditors receive in their
state. The only combination of judgments and liquidations which can produce
this novel result is a judgment in one state and liquidation in another, each
state giving the foreign creditor an advantage over local creditors.
The trouble lies in faulty analysis. The Constitution and Act of Congress
require that the judgments of the courts in one state to be given the same
faith and credit in a sister state as they have by "law or usage" in the courts of
the state in which they were rendered. Cast in terms of the problem involved
in Morris v. Jones, this rule creates an odd situation. How can the Illinois
court give the Missouri judgment the same effect in an Illinois liquidation pro-
ceeding that it has in Missouri? Does this require the Illinois court to decide
the case before it in the same way that a Missouri court would decide it on the
identical facts ?"' It at once appears that this is impossible because the same
facts in a Missouri court, i.e., a prior Missouri judgment presented to an Illi-
nois liquidator, could not arise. Does it mean that the Illinois liquidation
proceedings must deal with a prior Missouri judgment in the same way that
Missouri liquidation proceedings would deal with a prior Illinois judgment?
If so, the "law or usage" to which the forum is referred would include the
56. For discussion of problems of this kind, see Cheatham, Res .Tldicata and the
Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hiunt, 44 COL. L. REv. 330, 337
et seq. (1944) ; Dutton, Characteri.ation, Res Judicata and the Lawyers' Clause, 22 IND.
L. J. 201 (1947).
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Missouri Conflict of Laws rule, and the full faith and credit clause together
with the Act of Congress would raise the most logically intolerable problem
of all, the renvoi.17 For presumably the statute would require from the 2Mlis-
souri courts what it demands from the Illinois courts and we find ourselves
at once involved in that endless oscillation, to Missouri and from Illinois,
which leads only to interminable chaos or chaotic termination. Finally, does
the rule mean that the Illinois courts must treat the Missouri judgment in the
same way that the Missouri courts would treat the same judgment in liquida-
tion proceedings there? This seems to be about the only thing the rule can
mean and make sense. If it does, then clearly the decision of the Court is
wrong because it is not disputed that the Missouri courts in liquidation pro-
ceedings would have done no better by Morris than the Illinois courts did." 8
If we examine this situation from the point of view of state policy what
do we find? The usual full faith and credit dilemma of the policy of one
state giving way to that of another? We find nothing of the kind. On the
contrary, we find the policy of both states to be the same, with the result that
the Constitution requires whichever forum the case arises in to subvert the
policy of both. The policy of Illinois in liquidation proceedings is equality of
distribution of assets. Foreign and local creditors are treated alike within
their priority classification. Missouri has the same policy."' But now, instead
of the earlier evil of one state seeking to give an advantage to local as against
foreign creditors, we have the singular result that they must give foreign credi-
tors an advantage over local ones, all in the name of full faith and credit.
A different but similarly complicated problem got a majority of the Court,
but not Mr. Justice Rutledge, into difficulty in the Magnolia Petroleum Co.
case.GO Five members of the Court held that an injured workman could not
obtain compensation in the state of his domicile after a previous award in the
state where he was injured even though the amount of the latter award was
57. See Cheatham, sapra note 56, at 338.
58. See McDonald v. Pacific States Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 1, 124 S. NV.2d 1157
(1939).
59. "We believe that the weight of authority is that the assets of insolvent insurance
companies should be treated as a unit, and disposed of for the benefit of all creditors
ratably without regard to the locations of the assets or the residence of creditors ...
Our [Missouri] statutes . . . provide a complete method for the dissolution of insolvent
insurance companies. They provide for the equitable and ratable distribution of the
assets to all the creditors without regard to . . . residence of creditors." McDonald v.
Pacific State Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 1, 12, 124 S. W.2d 1157, 1163 (1939).
Although Mr. Justice Douglas insisted that there was no issue of "priority of claims
against the property of the debtor" nor "of parity of treatment of creditors," 329 U. S.
545, 548 (1947), the Illinois legislation was accurately described by Mr. Just-ce Frank-
furter as providing "a fair sifting process for determining the amount of claims against
Illinois assets of an Illinois insurance company in liquidation in an Illinois court so as to
secure equality of treatment for all who assert claims against such a fund." 329 U. S. 545,
561-62 (1947).
60. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 (1943).
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deducted from the domiciliary award. The Court, per Chief Justice Stone,
held that since the first award was final and conclusive of the plaintiff's rights
in the state where rendered, full faith and credit required the same result in
the second state. Thus, Texas (the state of injury) blocked Louisiana (the
state of domicile) from giving its citizen the benefit of its more generous
provision for injured workmen.
Oddly enough, the Chief Justice had taken a different position ten years
earlier in Yarborough v. Yarborough, where the state in which a child had
subsequently acquired domicile sought to impose an additional obligation of
support on a father who had complied with a prior decree of another state
which had the effect there of being the final measure of his alimentary duty.6 '
The divorce and support decree had been rendered in Georgia where all the
parties were, at the time, domiciled. The second support decree was rendered
in South Carolina where the father had property and where the child at that
time was domiciled. After commenting on the unusual feature of the Georgia
law which so tied its own hands as "to foreclose all future inquiry into the
duty of maintenance however affected by changed conditions," the Chief
Justice continued, "Even though the Constitution does not deny to Georgia
the power to indulge in such a policy for itself, it by no means follows that it
gives Georgia the privilege of prescribing that policy for other states in which
the child comes to live." ' 2 Much emphasis was placed by the Chief Justice on
the interest the domiciliary state had in providing for the welfare of its infant
residents. Moreover, although he conceded the Georgia decree was affective
to govern the rights of the party in Georgia, he found "nothing in the decree
itself, or in the history of the proceedings which led to it, to suggest that it was
rendered with any purpose or intent to regulate or control the relationship of
parent and child, or the duties which flow from it, in places outside the State
of Georgia where they might later come to reside."63
So, in his dissent in Magnolia, Mr. Justice Black, with Justices Rutledge,
Douglas, and Murphy concurring, questioned the intent of the Texas decree
to conclude the injured workman's right to additional compensation under the
statute of his domicile, and doubted still further its power to do so if it had so
intended. 14 Four years later, the Court backed away from the Magnolia deci-
sion."3 Although there was a stipulation that the first award should not
prejudice the workman's right to additional compensation in another state, the
Court, in some way or other not made clear, based its decision in part on the
ground that the first award was only intended to be final as to the workman's
rights under the statute of that state.
61. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 213 (1933), Stone, C. J., dissenting.
62. Id. at 222-3.
63. Id. at 213.
64. 320 U. S. 430, 453-55 (1943).
65. Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U. S. 622 (1947).
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These cases, including the Yarborough decision, raise the difficult ques-
tion whether the full faith and credit clause and the Act of Congress make it
possible for one state, by purporting to do so, to close the door on another state
which may then have, or in the future may acquire, an interest equal or superior
to that of the first state so that the second state is helpless thereafter to apply
its own policy. The problem is bound to bob up again and the most likely
situation may be the next chapter in the unfolding story of "divisible divorce."
May a state, which is the domicile of the wife at the time of the divorce or
which becomes her domicile subsequently, impose a duty or an additional duty
on the ex-husband to support her, and will the answer be different if she is a
party to the divorce proceedings ?6 It is not inconceivable that the decreeing
state may intend only to determine the husband's duty under its law and not
universally or, if it intends otherwise, it may lack constitutional power so
sweepingly to tie the hands of all other states.
The full faith and credit clause, like all other constitutional provisions,
must be interpreted in the light of the history of the common law and our
entire system of jurisprudence. This, of course, includes the principles of
Conflict of Laws. Mr. Justice Rutledge respected the historical policies re-
flected in Conflict of Laws distinctions and gave them consideration in his
judgments in the application of the constitutional rule. Among these is the
policy of allowing to each state latitude in determining the time within which
actions in its courts may be instituted. This is an ancient and important policy.
The Supreme Court early concluded that the full faith and credit rule should
not be interpreted in a manner which would interfere with such policy.
It would be strange, if in the now well understood rights of nations
to organize their judicial tribunals, according to their notions of
policy, it should be conceded to them in every other respect than that
of prescribing the time within which suits shall be litigated in their
66. It will be remembered that in Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948), the wife ap-
peared in the Nevada proceedings which occurred after a Massachusetts support order.
The Massachusetts court thereafter rendered a decree enforcing the support order on
the grounds that the Nevada court had lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed
on grounds of res judicata, following Sherrer v. Sherrer. The Massachusetts court gave
no indication that the local support order would have survived if the Nevada decree
had been valid.
In Lynn v. Lynn, 275 App. Div. 269, 88 N. Y. S.2d 791 (1st Dep't 1949), a New
York wife had appeared in a Nevada proceeding but the issue of support was not
litigated. It was held that the Nevada decree did not affect a prior New York support
order nor the power of the New York court to increase the amount of such order.
An Ohio case has held that an original alimony decree may be rendered at the wife's
domicile after a sister-state divorce where, although both parties were present, the issue
of support was not litigated. Metzger v. Metzger, 32 Ohio App. 202, 167 N. E. 690
(1929). Cf. Bates v. Bodie, 245 U. S. 520 (1918), where the support issue had been
litigated.
On some of the potentialities of the completely divisible divorce, see Carey & Mac-
Chesney, Divorces by the Consent of the Parties and Divisible Divorce Decrees, 43 IL. L.
REv. 608, 618 (1948) ; and see 47 CoL. L. REv. 1069 (1947).
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courts. Prescription is a thing of policy, growing out of the ex-
perience of its necessity; and the time after which suits or actions
shall be barred, has been, from a remote antiquity, fixed by every
nation, in virtue of that sovereignty by which it exercises its legisla-
tion for all persons and property within its jurisdiction.
67
It is clearly just as much a "thing of policy" for a state to determine the
time within which suits or actions shall be brought as it is to determine "the
time after which suits or actions shall be barred." Nevertheless this policy
was denied the state of South Dakota, Justices Rutledge, Black, Murphy, and
Douglas dissenting, in as fuzzy an application of the full faith and credit
doctrine as has yet been made. South Dakota had a statute of limitations of
six years for commencing actions on contracts. It had another statute, making
void contractual provisions which imposed a shorter limitation. In Order of
United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,"' the Supreme Court held that South
Dakota could not apply these statutes to an action brought in the South Dakota
courts by a South Dakota citizen on a contract of insurance made and to be
performed in South Dakota. Since the defendant was a fraternal benefit
society, incorporated under the laws of Ohio, a six-month limitation in its
constitution, valid under Ohio law, must receive full faith and credit. As
Mr. Justice Burton put it, ". . . under such circumstances, South Dakota, as
the state of the forum, was required by the Constitution of the United States,
to give full faith and credit to the public acts of Ohio under which the fraternal
benefit society was incorporated .... -19
This odd result was said to depend, in some way not made clear, on the
nature of the relationship of the members of a fraternal benefit society. The
mysterious "indivisible unity" which characterizes such associations was
thought to require suspension of the right of a state to apply its own policy as
to limitation of actions, not so much in favor of the policy of a sister state, as
of the defendant society.70 Mr. Justice Black found no evidence that the in-
surance business of a fraternal company is conducted differently in any im-
portant way from that of a mutual, reciprocal, or joint stock company.
71
Mr. Justice Burton, however, thought the members of such societies, "inter-
woven with their financial rights and obligations, . . . have other common
interests incidental to their memberships, which give them a status toward one
another that involves more mutuality of interest and more interdependence
than arises from purely business and financial relationships. ' 72 One searches
the opinion and the authorities cited in vain to discover just how this fas-
67. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 327 (U. S. 1839).
68. 331 U. S. 586 (1947).
69. Id. at 589.
70. See Harper, The Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 COL. L. REv. 883,
895 (1947).
71. 331 U. S. 586, 640 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
72. 331 U. S. 586, 605-6 (1947).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
cinating "status" of the members of fraternal benefit societies conducts full
faith and credit lightning to South Dakota's power to determine the period
within which South Dakota contracts may be enforced in South Dakota
courts by South Dakota citizens.
The most recent inroad on a state's right to apply its own policy as to the
bringing of actions in its courts was in Union National Bank v. Lamb,"
Mr. Justice Rutledge again dissenting. This time, for practical purposes, only
Mr. Justice Black joined him.74 Action was brought in a Missouri court on
a Colorado judgment which had been "revived" more than ten years after
rendered. A Missouri statute forbade actions on judgments after ten years
from the time rendered or revived and forbade revival after ten years from
the time of rendition. The Missouri court dismissed the action. The Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that Roche v. McDonald7 was "dispositive of
the merits." The case was made to turn on the question whether, under
Colorado law, the "revival" there created a "new" judgment, entitled to full
faith and credit in Missouri or whether the revivor "did no more than to ex-
tend the statutory period in which to enforce the old judgment."
It is, of course, not only inappropriate but unsafe to speculate on the
reasons for the dissent of a justice who gives no reasons for it. It seems
clear here, however, that the technicality which distinguishes a "new" from a
"revived" judgment did not appear persuasive to Mr. Justice Rutledge. In
any event there are those to whom the distinction appears inadequate as a
basis for narrowing the latitude allowed to a state to apply the important policy
of its own statute of limitations. As for Roche v. McDonald, the situation is
entirely different. One hardly need split a hair to distinguish between an
action on a sister-state judgment, admittedly within the statutory limitations
of the forum, and an action on a judgment originally rendered in another
73. 337 U. S. 38 (1949).
74. Justices Rutledge and Black wrote no opinion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote
what was technically a dissenting opinion. Id. at 45. He could not determine from
the opinion of the Missouri court whether it did or did not regard the Colorado judgment
as one of revivor or a "new" judgment, and he thought the Supreme Court should not
initiate "an independent examination of Colorado law." Id. at 48. Moreover he could
not determine that the Missouri court did not think it immaterial and that some non-
federal ground was not the, basis of the decision. He thus wanted to vacate the judgment
and remand. Mr. Justice Douglas, for the majority, reversed because he thought the
Missouri court placed revived judgments on the same basis as original judgments, regard-
less of whether such a judgment under Colorado law is treated as "new." The effect
of both views is a remand for the Missouri court to pass on the question whether the
Colorado revivor proceedings result in a "new" judgment, as to which Roche v. McDonald
will be "dispositive."
75. 275 U. S. 449 (1928). In this case the judgment had been first rendered in
Washington. After the statute of limitation had run in that state, the judgment creditor
obtained a judgment on the Washington judgment in Oregon. He later sued in Washing-
ton on the Oregon judgment. An adverse judgment in Washington was reversed by the
Supreme Court which held that the Oregon judgment was entitled to full faith and credit.
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state many years before the forum's period of limitation and whose present
extra-state efficacy depends upon the conceptual distinctions between "re-
vival" and a "new" judgment.
The full faith and credit clause and the Congressional action under it
demand a "lawyer's lawyer." To utilize it effectively requires a high degree
of technical skill and "know how." It also demands statesmanship. It is,
indeed, like the commerce clause, a powerful and effective instrument to
maintain the delicate balance which our federal system must have. Both
craftsmanship of a high order and depth of wisdom are necessary to apply
and withhold its mandate appropriately.
A study of Mr. Justice Rutledge's contributions in the solution of the
vexing problems which arise under full faith and credit eloquently confirm the
appraisal quoted at the beginning of this article, now sadly to be phrased in
the past tense. He was bold, willing to innovate, did not shrink from broad
responsibility, and would not have the Court abdicate its powers.
